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When Neither Party Will Fix the Roof 
by Roger Bernhardt, * Professor of Law, Golden Gate University, San Francisco CA 
The issue in ASP Props. Group, L.P. v 
Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 CA4th 1257, 35 CR3d 
343 was whether a commercial tenant was 
bound to replace a roof entirely because the 
lease required it to keep the premises (includ-
ing, specifically, the roof) in good and safe 
condition, even though the roof had already 
outlasted its economic life at the time the 
covenant was made. When the tenant refused 
to replace it, the landlord sought to evict him. 
The California courts ruled in favor of 
the tenant, holding that a tenant's covenant to 
maintain or repair does not include an obliga-
tion to replace an old, dilapidated roof with a 
new roof; a tenant generally is not required to 
restore premises to a better condition than 
existed when they were let and the duty to 
maintain means to maintain it only in the con-
dition that existed when the agreement was 
made 
That particular outcome is not surpris-
ing, given that the language of the repair clause 
was not that clear, there were special circum-
stances involved in how and why it carne 
about, and there was enough parol evidence to 
make almost any construction of the clause 
justifiable. While the old common law rule 
used to be that a tenant's covenant to repair 
automatically included an obligation to 
rebuild, except when that burden was specifi-
cally excluded!, courts have since moved so far 
away from that formalistic position that today 
explicit drafting or exceptional circumstances 
would be needed to reach the same result. But 
that should not make tenant lawyers think that 
all of their clients' problems are over. 
Saying that a tenant cannot be evicted 
for failing to replace a bad roof does not 
answer numerous other questions that the situ-
ation generates. The roof won't replace itself 
and who is going to fix it? The easy answer-
the landlord has to fix-is probably as incor-
rect as contending that the tenant had to do so. 
A hard concept to get across to law stu-
dents is that saying that a tenant does not have 
a duty to repair is not the equivalent of saying 
that the landlord therefore does have that duty. 
Our students are so imbued with notions of a 
duty everywhere (probably from taking too ., 
many Torts courses) that they are uncomfort-
able with the prospect that neither landlord nor 
tenant may owe a duty to the other, as far as 
certain repairs are concerned. But mutual non-
duty is, indeed, the original rule regarding dis-
repairs in rental properties, and may still be, 
when the premises are commerciaJ.2 If the roof 
was broken at the commencement of the term, 
the principle of caveat emptor kept the tenant 
from demanding that the landlord correct it. 3 
And if it broke during the term, the landlord's 
current lack of possession eliminated imposi-
tion of any cornmon law repair duty on him 
*1 wrote this comment originally for my column in the California Real Property Law Reporter. The ACREL Editors then asked me to 
make it less provincial, so I have added, for national authority, quotes from all of the major Property textbooks. 
1 "A tenant's covenant to repair was treated at common law as a covenant to restore, and a tenant who had agreed to repair was required 
to restore the improvements after accidental destruction ... . The common-law rule has been abrogated by statute in case of nonnegligent 
damage. It was not applied to a lease of part of a building where application of the rule would require the tenant to rebuild parts of a 
building not included in the lease." Friedman on Leases, Milton R. Friedman and Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. PLI 2004 § 9: 1.2. 
2 "When no duty to repair exists, neither party may terminate the lease for the other's failure to make a repair. Thus, at common law, a 
tenant could not stop paying rent because his premises were destroyed nor could his landlord terminate his estate if he refused to repair 
or rebuild the destroyed premises." Bernhardt & Burkhart, Black Letter Law of Real Property. §V(E)(d). (4th Ed, 2003, West). 
'''One taking a lease of property stands in the position of a purchaser, who can and is bound to inspect the property, and is consequent-
ly subject to the rule of caveat emptor. It results that there is no implied warranty by the lessor as to the condition of the premises, and 
the lessee cannot ordinarily complain that they were not, at the beginning of the tenancy, in a tenantable condition, or were not adapted 
for the purposes for which they were leased." Tiffany Real Property, Herbert T. Tiffany and Basil Jones, 2005 §99 
continued on page 13 
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(the lan~lord).4 The consequences of the injury
were thus shared between the parties: the tenant
suffered during the balance of its term and the
landlord suffered thereafter. Thus, either could
fix it, if either of them wanted to, but neither
owed the other any duty to fix it.
As a background rule, this doctrine pro-
vides a useful setting for negotiating the par-
ties' respective repair rights and obligations.
However, in ASP, the landlord made no prom-
ise to fix, and the tenant's promise to maintain
was held not to include any duty to replace
(which was apparently the only kind of repair
that would work). Thus, the default rule was left
unaltered by this lease: neither side had the
power to order a new roof and then demand that
the other pay the roofer.
That means, inter alia, that a landlord
cannot evict the tenant for refusing to pay for a
new roof. But does it also mean that a tenant
can move out if the landlord won't pay for it
either? I think not. Since these are commercial
premises there is probably no implied warranty
of habitability nor any statutory repair-and-
deduct right involved - those tenant perquisites
apply to residential premises and are generally
not extended to commercial premises.5 I sus-
pect that just as the landlord cannot add the cost
of a new roof to the rent it collects from the ten-
ant, the tenant cannot subtract the cost of a new
roof from the rent it pays to the landlord. It is
a standoff.
But the standoff is unlikely to last forev-
er. The roof in ASP seemed to be leaking badly,
and that could make a difference. For a tenant,
a leaking roof can ruin its business activities
inside the building. (Who would want to shop
or work there?) But that does not mean the ten-
ant can quit. Even when premises are
untenantable, the theory of constructive evic-
tion requires that the untenantability be due to
some breach by the landlord, and the tenant's
problem is that there may not be any repair duty
for the landlord to breach.6 That means that if
the tenant does quit without continuing to pay
the rent, it may breaching its lease and making
itself liable for damages or future rent, depend-
ing on how the jurisdiction treats abandonment
before the end of the term and to what extent it
requires the landlord to mitigate. 7
Conversely, for a landlord, a leaky roof
can mean that rain gets inside, warps the floors,
damages the electrical system and does other
permanent damage unless protective action is
taken. If the tenant is still in possession, its
common law duty to avoid waste8 means that it
4 "Where the subject matter of the lease is improved land, as distinguished from a lease of a part of a building, the tenant, at common
law, remains liable under his lease and is obligated to pay rent although the building or buildings are destroyed by fire, flood or other
casualty." Hovenkamp & Kurtz, Principles of Property Law §9.4, 6th Ed, West.
'''This duty [to repair] remains to this day in most jurisdictions for the commercial tenant. Such a landlord has no duty to repair the
leased premises, absent an express covenant in the lease." Burke & Snoe, Property: Examples & Explanations, Aspen 2001, Ch. 18.
Furthermore, although it was not stated too clearly in the opinion, the structure looks like a single-occupant building, making the roof
unlikely to be treated as a common area under the landlord's retained control, and thereby generating some independent obligation on
the landlord to replace or repair it.
6 "As an actual eviction by the landlord is wrongful, so must a constructive eviction be caused by a wrong laid to the landlord."
Stoebuck & Whitman, Hornbook on Real Property §6.33
'These are commercial premises and the landlord is probably subject to a less rigorous duty to mitigate as is the case for residential
abandonments. "Some states have extended the duty to mitigate damages to commercial tenancies on the ground that they should be
governed by ordinary contract principles that encourage parties to avoid damages by acting to protect their interest when a promisor
breaches ... However, other courts resist the trend, holding that a commercial landlord has no duty to mitigate damages when a tenant
abandons the premises before the end of the lease term." Singer, Introduction to Property §IO.4. Aspen, 2d Ed, 2005. But even if this
landlord has a duty to mitigate, how much can he be expected to receive from renting a building with a leaking roof? Or does mitiga-
tion mean that he has to replace the roof at his own expense?
8 "Under this doctrine [permissive waste], a tenant was obligated to exercise reasonable. are to protect the leased premises from injury.
Each tenant had a duty to effect any minor repairs that were necessary to maintain the condition of the premises." Sprankling,
Understanding Property Law, Lexis 2000 §17.02. continued on page 14
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should use ordinary care to preserve the prem-
ises against the action of the elements - at least
cover up the roof before the rains start. A fail-
ure to do so could make the tenant liable for
the resulting 10ss,9e.g., the buckled floor. The
fact that the lease provision was held not to
compel the tenant to purchase a new roof does
not mean that it would be held also to absolve
the tenant from paying for the floor that was
ruined because it was not covered. The duty to
avoid waste is a separate obligation and does
not depend on the existence of an underlying
repair covenant in the lease; indeed a tenant
might have a duty to avoid waste (cover up the
roof now) even where the lease imposes upon
the landlord the duty to repair it (later, after
notice, etc.).
A different complication arises if the
roof caves in entirely. The old common law
made destruction of the premises legally irrele-
vant - the tenant still had its leasehold estate, 10
but that has often been replaced by the civil law
rule that loss or destruction of a material part or
a material inducement for entering the lease
allows termination, 11 However, if the tenant is
wrong in its opinion that it is entitled to quit,
then its departure is simply a wrongful abandon-
ment, subjecting it to rent or damage liability.
Finally, there is the city, where the
building is located; under its building and safe-
ty codes, it surely can revoke the certificate of
occupancy and padlock premises with a bad
roof until it is replaced. If the tenant is thus
locked out by the city, does she still owe rent?
The burden of code compliance is initially on
the owner of property, but in many cases - as
here - the tenant has covenanted to keep the
premises in compliance with these codes.
Those clauses act like repair clauses in putting
the burden on the tenant to do the work but that
does not mean that they will be treated any bet-
ter than the roof clause was here.12 It is unlike-
ly that a compliance clause would lead to a
result contrary to what a maintenance clause is
held to .require.
But that still leaves unanswered the
questions of whether the tenant will continue
to owe rent after the premises have been shut
down by the city, or whether the landlord can
evict the tenant, either to get rid of her or just
to get the city off his back. Answering all of
these speculative questions can be rather
uncomfortable .•
9 Failure to avoid waste is also often a ground for eviction. Possibly, the landlord might be entitled to evict the tenant for not covering
the roof even if he cannot evict her for failing to replace it.
10 "The question has frequently arisen whether destruction of or injury to part of the premises, ordinarily a building upon the land
leased, terminates the liability for rent, and the great majority of the decisions are, as elsewhere stated, to the effect that, apart from a
statute or special stipulation to the contrary, the liability for rent continues as before. This view involves the view that the tenancy itself
still continues." Tiffany Real Property, Herbert T. Tiffany and Basil Jones. § 154.
II "Dissatisfaction with the inequities of the common-law rule led to the enactment of a group of statutes beginning during the last cen-
tury. They were aimed at the rule that continues a tenant's liability for rent after destruction by sudden unexpected casualty such as fire,
flood, tornado, and the like, though the tenant had been without negligence or other fault. Not all the statutes are this broad. A few are
limited to damage by fire and therefore make no change in the tenant's common-law status with respect to damage from other causes.
Although there is considerable variety among the statutes, all have two matters in common. They apply only if the parties have not
agreed otherwise and can be overridden by provisions of a lease. They relieve a tenant from his common-law liability only if the tenant
and his subtenants, if any, are free of fault for the destruction." Friedman on Leases, Milton R. Friedman and Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.
PLI 2004, § 9:2
12 Perhaps with intentional irony, Friedman on Leases opines: "It is basic that a lease will be construed as the parties intended. In
searching for this intention the courts have not allowed themselves to be pinned down by the language of these broad clauses."
Friedman on Leases, Milton R. Friedman and Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. PLI 2004 § 11.1 That certainly is the case in California where
our courts reject a "four comers" analysis (i.e., what the words actually say) in favor of a multifactor analysis that involves e.g., consid-
ering the nature of the repair, the duration of the term, the remaining life of the lease, etc. See Brown v Green (1994) 8 C4th 812, 35
CR2d 598; Hadian v Schwartz (1994) 8 C4th 836, 35 CR2d 589. That approach obviously makes it hard to predict results.
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